Bosnian Genocide

The Bosnian genocide of 1995 was centered around the Bosnian Serbs committing so called “ethnic cleansing” against Bosnian Muslim, also called Bosniak, citizens. As of 1991, Bosnia had a plurality of Bosniaks, but the Bosnian Serbs led by Radovan Karadzic wanted to achieve a Serbian state. In the spring of 1992, the Bosnian Serb forces aimed to drive out the standing government forces, and instill ethnic cleansing on the Bosniaks and the Croatians. Although a Croatian-Bosniak federation attempted to negotiate with the Serbs, the Bosnian Serbs took over nearly ¾ of the country by 1993. In 1993, the United Nations declared Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde as “safe havens” under the standing Bosnian government, intended to be disarmed, protected by international forces.

Consequently, the United Nations was left with two choices: either to keep neutrality and only provide relief efforts, which would leave the Muslims unprotected; or to militarily intervene on behalf of the Muslim victims. The United States strongly believed that NATO military intervention was necessary, at the very least to protect the safe areas from Serbian forces. However, many European nations held a differing view. The European troops sent by the UN at the moment were only there for humanitarian purposes, with no commitment to any further military intervention. In addition, air strikes in May 1995 proved ineffective, which caused the UN to believe that NATO air strikes would do little. Thus, the Bosnian Serbs were allowed to continue their “ethnic cleansing.”

In 1995, Serbian forces arrived in Srebrenica, defeating the Dutch peacekeeping forces, with no additional UN forces arriving to protect the city. Subsequently, the Serbs sexually assaulted many of the women while massacring the men. When Zepa was captured soon after, the Serbs made it clear that their plan was to end the war in 1995 with a victory. The over 7000 lives lost in Srebrenica brought shame to the United Nations, prompting the United States and its allies to declare that any Serbian threats to Gorazde would be met with military air retaliation on behalf of NATO.

On the United States’ side of the situation, before 1995, all of the proposals for military intervention in Bosnia were rejected by White House staff. Clinton’s previous foreign policy failures, such as a failed military operation in Somalia and inaction during genocide in Rwanda, may have also played some part in reluctance prior to the Serbs’ actions in Srebrenica. However, the genocide in Srebrenica as well as the requirement for public appeal (due to the upcoming 1996 elections) prompted US and NATO intervention. In November 1995, peace talks were held in Dayton, Ohio.

Although the NATO intervention was too late to stop the largest portion of the atrocities committed by the Bosnian Serbs, Clinton’s victorious military intervention did increase his popularity and showed growth from Somalia and Rwanda. The complications and difficulty of foreign policy is made evident through the international response to the Bosnian Genocide: every nation had its reason whether or not to be in favor of NATO intervention, and the agreed upon ending was bittersweet. Even though NATO had stopped the Serbs from continuing their massacre and done what it could to bring justice to the perpetrators, nothing could reverse the 7000 left dead in Srebrenica, on top of the many other victims across the years of conflict.

https://www.brookings.edu/articles/decision-to-intervene-how-the-war-in-bosnia-ended/
https://www.history.com/topics/1990s/bosnian-genocide